Samenvatting / Summary in English - Kotiy v Ukraine

Kotiy v. Ukraine - 28718/09

Judgment 5.3.2015 [Section V] See: [2015] ECHR 253

Article 8

Article 8-1

Respect for family life

Respect for private life

Detention and preventive measures outside the country where the applicant worked and lived with his family: violation

Article 5

Article 5-1

Lawful arrest or detention

Detention and preventive measures in the absence of reasonable suspicion of an offence: violation

Facts - In April 2008 the Kyiv Police Department instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant in connection with financial fraud and listed him as a wanted person on the grounds that he did not live at his registered place of residence in Ukraine and his whereabouts were unknown. The applicant had in fact by then been working and living with his family in Germany for several years. In November 2008, while attending the migration service department in Kharkiv to renew his international travel passport, he was arrested and escorted to the district police department in Kyiv, where he was arrested after questioning. The applicant was released after ten days after signing a written undertaking not to leave his registered place of residence in Ukraine and surrendering his passports. The applicant lodged complaints with the District Court against his unlawful arrest and detention, the alleged violation of procedural rules by the investigator and an interference with his family and professional life. In December 2011 the preventive measures were lifted and the passports returned.

Law

Article 5 § 1: The Court had to identify whether the applicant’s detention had been arbitrary and incompatible with the purpose of Article 5 § 1. When questioned at the police department in November 2008 he had not been free to leave. Given the existence of a coercive element, the Court found that he had been deprived of his liberty within the meaning of Article 5 § 1. His arrest had not been formalised through an arrest report until several hours later and the report had merely repeated general grounds for the arrest without demonstrating reasonable suspicion of the commission of a criminal offence. Nor did the report justify the applicant’s preliminary detention during questioning for the specific purposes laid down in the domestic law for applying such measures. The Court did not accept a justification based on the applicant’s listing as a wanted person since he could not be considered as having been in hiding while living in Germany. It therefore found the applicant’s detention between 14 and 24 November 2008 incompatible with Article 5 § 1.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

Article 8: As a result of his undertaking not to abscond and the surrender of his passports, the applicant had been unable to travel to Germany where his family lived and where he pursued his professional activities. As to the justification for that interference, pursuant to Article 234 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant could have challenged the investigator’s decisions before the prosecutor or the court. However, the Court did not consider that the possibility of challenging the decision before the prosecutor afforded adequate safeguards ensuring a proper review while a challenge before a court would only have been possible at the stage of the preliminary hearing of the criminal case or its consideration on the merits and could not be considered a timely remedy. During the investigation period of three years and seven months, no other judicial remedy had been available to the applicant. As a result, the domestic law did not meet the requirements of the quality of law for the purpose of the Convention.

In addition, although the interference pursued the legitimate aim of preventing crime, it had been extensive. The fact that the applicant was unemployed at the material time did not mitigate the fact that he had been temporarily prevented from returning to Germany to resume his family and private life. Furthermore, the domestic authorities had not considered other non-custodial preventive measures available under domestic law and no effective remedies had been available. Since signing the written undertaking not to abscond, the applicant had not been asked to take part in any investigatory procedure. In sum, his right to respect for his private and family life had not been balanced with the public interest in ensuring the effective investigation of a criminal case.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

The Court also found a violation of Article 5 § 5 of the Convention.

Article 41: EUR 6,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

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Uitspraak EHRM over recht op priveleven na 20 jaar verblijf en uitzetten vanwege doodslag

Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 184

April 2015

Khan v. Germany - 38030/12

Judgment 23.4.2015 [Section V] See: Chamber Judgment [2015] ECHR 411

Article 8

Expulsion

Proposed removal of a mentally ill person who had lived and worked in the host country for more than twenty years: expulsion would not constitute a violation

Facts - The applicant moved from Pakistan to Germany in 1991 with her husband. Three years later her son was born. She and her husband divorced. The applicant worked as a cleaner in different companies and obtained a permanent residence permit in Germany in 2001. In 2005 she committed manslaughter in a state of acute psychosis. She was diagnosed with schizophrenia and confined to a psychiatric hospital. In 2009 her expulsion was ordered as she was found to pose a danger to public safety. Her mental health subsequently improved and she was granted days of leave and allowed to work full-time in the hospital laundry. The applicant lodged appeals on the grounds that her expulsion would interfere with her right to respect for her family life with her son and that her specific circumstances had not sufficiently been taken into account. The domestic courts found that, in addition to a risk of reoffending, the applicant was not integrated into German society since she spoke no German and basic medical care for psychiatric patients was available in big cities in Pakistan. Following a recommendation in a medical report, she was released on probation. She continued to work, showed balanced behaviour and was in regular contact with her son.

Law - Article 8: Previous Court judgments had shown that the strength or weakness of social ties were best dealt with by assessing the proportionality of the applicant’s expulsion under Article 8 § 2. The expulsion order was based on Section 55 of the “Act on the Residence, Economic Activity and Integration of Foreigners in the Federal Territory” which permitted expulsion in the event of danger to public safety and law and order. The measure pursued the legitimate aim of public safety.

As to whether expulsion was in the specific circumstances of the case necessary in a democratic society, the Court noted that the offence, though serious, had been committed in a state of mental incapacity, the applicant had lived for more than 20 years in Germany and, by the time the lawfulness of the expulsion order was established domestically, her condition had improved and there was no indication that she had reoffended at any point. However, the applicant’s son was now an adult and mere bonds of affection between adult family members did not enjoy specific family life protection. Although the applicant had been integrated into the German labour market, she had not produced any other evidence of participation in social life. She still had family members in Pakistan and was familiar with the language and culture. Although, since her relatives in Pakistan refused to help, problems might arise regarding her medical care, it was possible that these could be overcome with her pension from Germany. Even taking into consideration a rather difficult environment for the applicant in Pakistan, the possible problems did not carry enough weight to represent an overwhelming obstacle for her return there.

Weighing the impact on the applicant’s private life against the danger posed to public safety, the Court did not find that the German authorities had overstepped their margin of appreciation.

Conclusion: expulsion would not constitute a violation (six votes to one).

(See, generally, the Factsheets on Expulsions and extraditions and on Mental health)

 Met dank aan: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2015/442.html


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Het EVRM is er niet alleen voor immigranten. Voor sommige onderdanen de enige weg om recht te halen

“UK must not think only of itself”: Massacre families urge UK not to leave ECHR – Alice Donald

Photo credit: Guardian.co.uk

The Conservative Party’s proposals to introduce a British Bill of Rights and Responsibilities that would weaken the UK’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) – and the legal chaos that would ensue if it was ever enacted – have been hotly debated. The proposal makes clear that if the Council of Europe was to reject the UK’s unilateral move, as it would be bound to, the UK ‘would be left with no alternative but to withdraw’ from the Convention. 
The policy is highly isolationist. The brief section on the ‘international implications’ of the plan does not pause to consider the impact of withdrawal on the other 46 states on the Council of Europe or the Convention system as a whole. Nor does it address the implications for the UK’s ability to promote human rights and the rule of law in countries with significantly worse human rights records.
This is despite the evident risk of contagion to newer Council of Europe states. The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Nils Muižnieks, has argued that if the UK persists in its disrespect for the Strasbourg Court, exemplified by its protracted non-compliance with the judgment on prisoners’ voting rights, this would

… send a strong signal to other member states, some of which would probably follow      the UK’s lead and also claim that compliance with certain judgments is not possible,     necessary or expedient. That would probably be the beginning of the end of the   ECHR system.

The spectre of contagion has now found expression from a surprising source – the bereaved families of the Beslan massacre in 2004, in which 331 people, including 179 children, died after a three-day siege at a school seized by Chechen separatists came to a violent end.
A decade on, the families were in Strasbourg last week for a public hearing in their case against the Russian authorities, which stand accused of failing to prevent the massacre despite having detailed intelligence warnings; compounding the loss of life by the use of indiscriminate weapons such as flame-throwers; and failing to conduct an adequate investigation into the events in order to establish responsibility.
As their case was put by lawyers from the Russian NGO Memorial and the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre (EHRAC) based at Middlesex University, bereaved relatives and applicants who were themselves hostages watched and wept, many wearing photographs of their lost loved ones.
‘The UK must not think only of itself’
The applicants, interviewed by EHRAC, spoke eloquently about the importance of the Strasbourg Court to their struggle for justice. Any future UK withdrawal would be a ‘catastrophe’ for the rule of law in Russia, they argue, and would be taken as a green light for President Vladimir Putin to flout Russia’s human rights commitments.
Voiced mainly by Ella Kasayeva, and her sister Emma Tagayeva, who lost two sons and her husband in the massacre, the reflections of the families should make for sobering reading for the UK isolationists.
They are translated below from the original Russian.

Lees verder in het originele blog artikel hier: http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2014/10/24/uk-must-not-think-only-of-itself-massacre-families-urge-uk-not-to-leave-echr-alice-donald/#more-24684





Interessant artikel? Deel het eens met uw netwerk en help mee met het verspreiden van de bekendheid van dit blog. Er staan wellicht nog meer artikelen op dit weblog die u zullen boeien. Kijk gerust eens rond. Zelf graag wat willen plaatsen? Mail dan webmaster@vreemdelingenrecht.com In verband met geldwolven die denken geld te kunnen claimen op krantenartikelen die op een blog als deze worden geplaatst maar na meestal een dag voor de krantenlezers aan leeswaardigheid hebben ingeboet terwijl wij vreemdelingenrecht specialisten ze soms wel nog jaren gebruiken om er een kopie van te maken voor een zaak ga ik over tot het plaatsen van alleen het eerste stukje. Ja ik weet het: de kans dat u doorklikt is geringer dan wanneer het hele artikel hier staat en een kopie van het orgineel maken handig kan zijn voor uw zaak. Wilt u zelf wat overnemen van dit weblog. Dat mag. Zet er alleen even een link bij naar het desbetreffende artikel zodat mensen niet alleen dat wat u knipt en plakt kunnen lezen maar dat ook kunnen doen in de context.

Britse toprechter vindt het EHRM een bedreiging voor de democratie. U ook? Lees zijn artikel.

Vandaag staat er in een grote Britse krant een stuk waarin een Britse voormalig toprechter zich verzet tegen de invloed van uitspraken op het gebied van het EVRM op nationale wet- en regelgeving. Hij is van mening dat een groepje niet-gekozen rechters niet een democratisch gekozen parlement kan dwingen om hun visie verplicht in de wet op te nemen. Zie hieronder een stukje uit de krant en zijn artikel. Als voorbeeld noemt hij artikel 8 EVRM.

Dit maakt dat ik me afvraag of hier in Nederland ooit discussie over is (geweest). Sowieso lijken we hier qua nationale rechtspraak er minder van uit te gaan dat artikel 8 EVRM een absoluut recht is dan in Engeland. Maar we respecteren hier dat verdragsverplichtingen boven nationale wet- en regelgeving gaan en zien binnen het Trias Politica systeem juist rechters als de controlerende organen van de wetgever en de uitvoerende organen.

Hoe ziet u het?

 

The European Court of Human Rights is a threat to democracy, a former Lord Chief Justice said yesterday.

Lord Judge said the way the Strasbourg-based court ordered Britain to follow its instructions was ‘a negation of the democratic process’.

Strasbourg demands, he said, meant that political decisions were left ‘exclusively to a body of unelected judges’. 

And Lord Judge, who retired last year as the most senior judge in England and Wales, said the campaign by the human rights court to impose its will on Parliament ‘represents a dramatic and unconstitutional extension of judicial authority’.

In the strongest attack on Strasbourg made by a leading British legal authority, Lord Judge’s comments came at a key moment in the political struggle over Europe between the Tories and Ukip and at a time when Strasbourg is pressing the Coalition to heed the court’s requirement that Britain allows convicted prisoners to vote.

Lord Judge, 73, has previously made measured criticisms of the court. But in an article for the Bar Council’s magazine, Counsel, he accused the court and its leaders of trespassing beyond the bounds of Britain’s constitution and the democratic practices that underpin it.

Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2775796/Human-rights-court-threat-democracy-Ex-Lord-Chief-Justice-blasts-unelected-Strasbourg-judges.html#ixzz3Esuy9e00
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 Het originele artikel door deze rechter staat hier:

A view from London

Lord Judge gives his own view on the European Court of Human Rights.
This response to the recent article in Counsel by my respected friend Dean Spielmann, President of the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg, addressing what he identified as the two main criticisms of the Court, is entirely personal.

My fundamental concern, and it is at the root of my disagreement with the President, is sovereignty. When I have written and spoken, as I have frequently in the past, about the rule of law, so long established in this country, I have always insisted that by rule of law, I did not mean rule by lawyers or judges. In my view in any country which embraces the principle of democracy, and certainly in the United Kingdom, ultimate authority over constitutional and societal questions is not vested in a body of judges, however wise and distinguished, and even if the system for their appointment is beyond criticism. This is true whether the democratic principle is enshrined in a modern or relatively modern written constitution, or in a constitution like our own, which has evolved over the centuries, and although not precisely written down as a modern constitutional document, is partly written, largely in statute, and partly based on convention.
In the United States of America, when the new republic was in its infancy, authority to interpret the constitution was vested in, or more accurately, taken over by, the Supreme Court. To me it remains an irony that in a written constitution which proclaims the authority of “we, the people”, the decision about, for example, the lawfulness of a termination of pregnancy was left to nine, or more accurately five judges. When that same question was decided here, Parliament enacted the Abortion Act 1967. Be that as it may, the Supreme Court of the United States differs significantly from the Strasbourg Court. The United States of America is a federal country, with a written constitution which applies to the entire sovereign state, where the authority of the Supreme Court reflects that constitution and has done so for two hundred years. Moreover, although the process is subject to stringent conditions, in the United States the constitution itself may be and very occasionally is amended. By contrast the Strasbourg Court is an international court for a group of independent sovereign states, each with its own separate democratic constitution, given authority by Treaty to interpret the Convention. It has no authority to amend or override the constitutional arrangements in any country which is party to the Convention.
Our Parliament is vested with authority to defer its sovereignty and pass it to anybody it may choose: hence the authority vested in the court in Luxembourg where the decisions are and, for as long as Parliament does not repeal the European Communities Act 1972, will remain binding. That legislative structure was not adopted when the Human Rights Act incorporated the Convention into domestic law, and did not vest the same authority in the Strasbourg Court. Indeed the debates in Parliament show that the suggestion that legislative authority should be given to the Strasbourg Court to “bind” our courts here was expressly rejected. And if it could not bind our courts, it certainly could not bind Parliament. This is not the time to analyse the difficulty our judiciary has had in interpreting the obligation imposed on the courts by the apparently simple words “take into account” which defines and limits the extent of the obligation of our courts to follow the decisions of the Strasbourg Court. Whatever those simple words may mean, they do not have the same meaning as the language which was used to create the relationship with the Court in Luxembourg. In any event, however the relationship with Strasbourg may be defined, the Human Rights Act represented an exercise of sovereignty in this jurisdiction by a sovereign parliament. That is our democratic process at work.
The President suggests that the “rule of law” sometimes “trumps” the democratic process. This proposition, however, begs the question which is, where in a democracy does the power to make the law ultimately reside? That is the sovereignty issue. In our constitution, as a result of the constitutional struggles in the 17th century, sovereignty was vested in parliament, or more precisely and pedantically, the King-in-Parliament. We have proceeded for centuries on the basis that the decisions of the highest court in the land can, if Parliament so decides, be subjected to parliamentary scrutiny and legislative amendment. A very good recent example was the enactment of the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008 which overruled the decision of the House of Lords in Davis [2008] 1 AC 1128. This principle has not undermined the rule of law in this country. On the contrary, it has stood the test of centuries. It represents simple acknowledgement that in our constitution, ultimate sovereignty does not rest with the courts, but with Parliament. What is more, in our arrangements, although Parliament is expected to respect a Treaty obligation, it is not bound to do so, and legislative enactments are themselves of course subject to subsequent amendment or repeal by the same or later parliaments. For us this principle, embodied in a constitution which is partly written and partly unwritten, underpins the rule of law and represents the rule of law in operation.
If I may say so, I respectfully agree with the observations of Lord Sumption that the Supreme Court in the United Kingdom should seek to follow the decisions of the Strasbourg Court and “treat them as the authorative expositions of the Convention”.  A different and perhaps stronger emphasis may be found in Baroness Hale’s identification of the “mirror principle”.  But I hasten to add that, as Baroness Hale herself appears to accept, the “mirror principle” is not a new way of describing the old fashioned rubber stamp. We should perhaps recognise that in this jurisdiction some aspects of the law are judge-made, but many more result from statute. Where the relevant law is judge-made the likelihood is that, applying the mirror principle, in the absence of any contrary enactment, the Supreme Court would follow the decision in Strasbourg, leaving it to Parliament to enact any amending legislation. In reality, because by definition any such enactment would be incompatible with the Convention, the chance of any subsequent contradictory legislation would be remote.
Where, however, any “offending” provisions depend on statute, and come under criticism from Strasbourg, different considerations apply. The President suggests that the government must ensure the passage of any necessary amending legislation. If he is right, whether or not Parliament agrees, Parliament is bound to enact laws which will bring the decisions of the Strasbourg Court into effect. Let me take prisoner voting as an example of the problems which arise. Many clear, absolutist, but contradictory positions can be taken. I believe that there are respectable arguments on both sides. At present prisoners cannot vote. Universal suffrage is a fundamental principle of a democratic state, but exceptions to it have always been recognised. Many are younger than the minimum age, however that is defined. Some are disqualified from voting. If the Supreme Court were to decide that any of these disqualifications infringe the Convention, a declaration of incompatibility would follow. Parliament should then address the issue and, despite the declaration of incompatibility, is entitled to maintain the “offending” disqualification. If Strasbourg concludes that the statutory disqualification constitutes an unjustified interference with any individual rights, the process by which this apparent flaw  may be amended continues to be statutory enactment. In my view it would be a negation of the democratic process for Members of Parliament to be obliged to vote for a measure with which they disagree. The Treaty obligation does not “trump” statute, and even if the government of the day supported the reform proposed by the Strasbourg Court, it could not guarantee success in Parliament.
There can surely be no argument about many Convention principles, which are reflective of the common law. Torture and slavery are prohibited. Life is sacred. A fair open trial of alleged criminal offences is axiomatic. There are, however, greater difficulties with provisions which refer to considerations which are “necessary” in a democratic society found, for example, in Article 8(2). If the President is correct, what constitutes a necessity in a democratic society is left, in the ultimate analysis, exclusively, to a body of unelected judges, and has been removed from the legislative body elected through the ordinary democratic processes. I recognise the importance attached by the Strasbourg Court when considering Convention rights in this context to the principles of proportionality and margin of appreciation. As we know, and he underlines, they loom large in the approach of the Strasbourg Court. The difficulty however is simply identified. As the Court sees these principles, they are principles of self-denial. Indeed in a very recent speech the President underlined “that the margin of appreciation is something that is allowed to States by the Court” (his emphasis). On this basis, the Court decides for itself whether and when these principles should apply. The President explains later in his article, the Court should “only exceptionally … impose its view on that of national authorities”, but this proposition underlines his opinion that it is entitled to do so when it thinks appropriate.
This brings us back to the issue of sovereignty. I profoundly disagree with the President’s opinion. The force of Treaty obligations and the authority of the Strasbourg Court on the correct interpretation of the Convention, and the rights established by it, are well understood. The adoption by our Supreme Court of Convention principles identified by the Strasbourg Court normally follows. The respect owed by Parliament to the views expressed by that Court is embodied in the Human Rights Act itself. But, using the President’s language, the imposition of those views on Parliament represents a dramatic and unconstitutional extension of judicial authority.

 Bron: http://www.counselmagazine.co.uk/articles/view-london

In verband met geldwolven die denken geld te kunnen claimen op krantenartikelen die op een blog als deze worden geplaatst maar na meestal een dag voor de krantenlezers aan leeswaardigheid hebben ingeboet terwijl wij vreemdelingenrecht specialisten ze soms wel nog jaren gebruiken om er een kopie van te maken voor een zaak ga ik over tot het plaatsen van alleen het eerste stukje. Ja ik weet het: de kans dat u doorklikt is geringer dan wanneer het hele artikel hier staat en een kopie van het orgineel maken handig kan zijn voor uw zaak. Wilt u zelf wat overnemen van dit weblog. Dat mag. Zet er alleen even een link bij naar het desbetreffende artikel zodat mensen niet alleen dat wat u knipt en plakt kunnen lezen maar dat ook kunnen doen in de context.

Uitspraak EHRM in zaak van Ethiopische afgewezen asielzoeker v Zweden

Deel uitspraak:

2.  The Court’s assessment

33.  The Court finds that the issues under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention are indissociable and it will therefore examine them together.

34.  The Court reiterates that Contracting States have the right, as a matter of well-established international law and subject to their treaty obligations, including the Convention, to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens (see, for example, Üner v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 46410/99, § 54, ECHR 2006-XII; Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A no. 94, p. 34, § 67; and Boujlifa v. France, judgment of 21 October 1997, Reports 1997‑VI, p. 2264, § 42). However, the expulsion of an alien by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question, if deported, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the receiving country. In these circumstances, Article 3 implies the obligation not to deport the person in question to that country (see, among other authorities, Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, §§ 124-125, ECHR 2008-...).

35. The assessment of whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the applicant faces such a real risk inevitably requires that the Court assesses the conditions in the receiving country against the standards of Article 3 of the Convention (Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, § 67, ECHR 2005-I). These standards imply that the ill-treatment the applicant alleges he will face if returned must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this is relative, depending on all the circumstances of the case (Hilal v. the United Kingdom, no. 45276/99, § 60, ECHR 2001-II). Owing to the absolute character of the right guaranteed, Article 3 of the Convention may also apply where the danger emanates from persons or groups of persons who are not public officials. However, it must be shown that the risk is real and that the authorities of the receiving State are not able to obviate the risk by providing appropriate protection (H.L.R. v. France, judgment of 29 April 1997, Reports 1997-III, § 40).

36.  The assessment of the existence of a real risk must necessarily be a rigorous one (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports 1996-V, § 96; and Saadi v. Italy, cited above, § 128). It is in principle for the applicant to adduce evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if the measure complained of were to be implemented, he would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (see N. v. Finland, no. 38885/02, § 167, 26 July 2005). In this respect, the Court acknowledges that, owing to the special situation in which asylum seekers often find themselves, it is frequently necessary to give them the benefit of the doubt when it comes to assessing the credibility of their statements and the documents submitted in support thereof. However, when information is presented which gives strong reasons to question the veracity of an asylum seeker’s submissions, the individual must provide a satisfactory explanation for the alleged discrepancies (see, among other authorities, Collins and Akasiebie v. Sweden (dec.), no. 23944/05, 8 March 2007; and Hakizimana v. Sweden (dec.), no. 37913/05, 27 March 2008).

37.  The above principles apply also in regard to Article 2 of the Convention (see, for example, Kaboulov v. Ukraine, no. 41015/04, § 99, 19 November 2009).

38.  In cases concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers, the Court does not itself examine the actual asylum applications or verify how the States honour their obligations under the Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees. It must be satisfied, though, that the assessment made by the authorities of the Contracting State is adequate and sufficiently supported by domestic materials as well as by materials originating from other reliable and objective sources such as, for instance, other contracting or non‑contracting states, agencies of the United Nations and reputable non‑governmental organisations (see N.A. v. the United Kingdom, no. 25904/07, § 119, 17 July 2008).

39.  Whilst being aware of reports of serious human rights violations in Ethiopia, the Court does not find them to be of such a nature as to show, on their own, that there would be a violation of the Convention if the applicant were to return to that country. The Court has to establish whether the applicant’s personal situation is such that his return to Ethiopia would contravene the relevant provisions of the Convention.

40.  The Court first notes that the applicant was heard by both the Migration Board and the Migration Court, that his claims were carefully examined by these instances and that they delivered decisions containing extensive reasons for their conclusions.

41.  The Court further notes that the applicant has failed to substantiate that the Ethiopian authorities were responsible for the incident of 12 June 2005 when he was attacked and beaten by two unknown men, lost a tooth and was cut on the hand. In the Court’s view, this incident cannot be viewed as anything other than an individual criminal act. It therefore cannot have any bearing on the assessment of whether the applicant will be at risk of being ill-treated by the Ethiopian authorities upon return.

42.  The Court does not find reason to question that the applicant may have been detained and subjected to ill-treatment in connection with the elections of 2005, first from September 2005 when he was allegedly detained for 3 months and 11 days, and for the second time from January 2006 when he claimed to have been detained for 5 months. The Court notes, in particular, the findings of the forensic evaluation (see § 12 above) according to which the applicant’s injuries were visibly compatible with his story and could support his claims that he had been subjected to torture in the way he had submitted. However, the Court observes that it cannot be excluded that the applicant may have obtained some of the injuries during the attack of 12 June 2005 (see the findings in § 41 above). Moreover, the Court finds, in agreement with the Swedish authorities, that the main issue at hand is whether it has been substantiated that the applicant would be at a real risk of being subjected to such treatment upon return. In this regard, the Court notes that the applicant appears to have been travelling around and preaching in public for almost a year after having escaped from prison and before leaving the country for Sweden in the summer of 2007 without the Ethiopian authorities showing any adverse interest in him.

43.  Moreover, the Court finds, in agreement with the Swedish authorities and referring to the authenticity assessment made by them, that the alleged arrest warrant submitted by the applicant has very little evidential value. The Court further finds that there are credibility issues with regard to how the applicant obtained the document. It does not appear probable that the authorities would hand the document over to some members of his church and the applicant has submitted no documents or particulars in support of that claim. The Court finds that there are further credibility issues with regard to the applicant’s submissions. For instance, it was at the oral hearing before the Migration Court that the applicant first submitted that one of the reasons why he feared ill-treatment upon return was that he was considered to be a spy. The Court finds it remarkable that he did not mention this earlier in the proceedings since, if it were true, it would be very relevant to his asylum application.

44.  Lastly, the Court notes that the applicant does not appear to have been politically active in Ethiopia, apart from working as an observer during the elections of 2005, that the incidents described by the applicant took place in 2005 and 2006 and that he left the country in 2007. In the light of this the Court considers, in agreement with the Swedish Government, that it is improbable that he would still be of interest to the Ethiopian authorities upon return.

45.  Having regard to the above, the Court must conclude that the applicant has failed to make it plausible that he would face a real risk of being killed or subjected to ill-treatment upon return to Ethiopia. Consequently, his deportation to that country would not involve a violation of Article 2 or 3 of the Convention.

Bron: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-114966

(zie tweede stuk hierover)


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Who should have the final word on human rights?

Op deze site http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2012/03/06/who-should-have-the-final-word-on-human-rights-dr-ed-bates/ is onderstaand artikel te vinden geschreven door dr Ed Bates. Ook in Nederland wordt hier over gediscussieerd.

Who should have the final word on human rights? – Dr Ed Bates

March 6, 2012 by 1 Crown Office Row

This is the first in a series of posts analysing the UK’s draft “Brighton Declaration” on European Court of Human Rights reform.
Much of the criticism directed toward the European Court of Human Rights over the last year or so, in this country at least, has been that it is too ready to overrule decisions made by the competent United Kingdom national authorities. It is said that British courts have already addressed the relevant human rights arguments under the Human Rights Act, so it is quite wrong that Strasbourg should now ‘overrule’ them.
A recent high profile example, apparently, was Strasbourg’s finding of a violation of the Convention in the Abu Qatada case, despite the House of Lords’ earlier ruling, holding no violation of the ECHR. (See, for example, the Home Secretary’s expressions of frustration about this).
The leaked (British) draft of the Brighton Declaration (for commentary, see here, here and here) concerning the on-going reform of the ECHR is apparently seeking to rebalance matters in this regard, and perhaps put the Strasbourg Court in its place.
A new admissibility criterion is proposed to make it clear that “an application is inadmissible if it is the same in substance as a matter that has been examined by a national court taking into account the rights guaranteed by the Convention”. There is a proviso: the application could be admissible if the “national court clearly erred in its interpretation or application” of the ECHR, or if it raises “a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention” [see para 23 (c) of the draft].
The proposal is aimed at cutting down the Court’s workload, but to the extent that it is based on the British attitude toward the Convention suggested above, it would be interesting to see the research which underpins it.
My own research into this is at a preliminary stage, but I would tentatively offer these conclusions. When British Human Rights Act cases have reached Strasbourg its jurisprudence has demonstrated that the European Court needs to have compelling reasons to upset the national courts’ qualitative and highly fact-specific assessment, based on Convention principles, that there had been no breach of the ECHR. There may be occasional, rare exceptions, but this is the approach Strasbourg takes in the great majority of instances. (For example, there was no (potential) violation of Article 3 in the recent Abu Qatada case).
Who has the last word on the interpretation of the ECHR?
Some of the most controversial Strasbourg judgments concerning British cases recently have occurred because the European Court adopted a different position on a key question of Convention law to the domestic courts. So these cases would raise a “serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention” and could well survive the new, proposed admissibility criterion being proposed.
Examples of this type of case include:

• The conclusion that there would be a violation of Article 6(1) (‘flagrant denial of justice’) if a person were to be deported to a country where there is a real risk that evidence obtained by torture would be used in a trial against him (The Strasbourg Court’s conclusion in Abu Qatada, in agreement with the Court of Appeal in that case, but in disagreement with the House of Lords on this aspect of ECHR law – the United Kingdom may seek a referral of the matter to the Grand Chamber);

• The conclusion that, despite the margin of appreciation available, a blanket ban on convicted prisoners voting in the UK violates Art 3 of Protocol 1 because it is disproportionate (a proposition rejected by the High Court and, apparently, by many MPs, but upheld by a Chamber and then a Grand Chamber in Hirst v United Kingdom (2005));

• The conclusion that the concept of ‘jurisdiction’ under Article 1 ECHR should be interpreted and applied so as to cover the claims brought by all applicants in Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (a broader reading of the Convention’s extra-territorial reach adopted (unanimously) by the Strasbourg Grand Chamber than was accepted by the House of Lords; the latter adopted a restrictive approach to Article 1, partly on the basis that the case could be ‘appealed’ to Strasbourg);

• The conclusion that storage of information on an extensive DNA database, as utilised on the facts in the Grand Chamber judgment of Marper v United Kingdom raised issues of “fundamental importance” under Art 8(1) ECHR (the House of Lords apparently regarding the interference with Art 8(1) as less serious than Strasbourg).

In all the above cases, there may have existed limited, or, in the case of Al-Skeini, sometimes conflicting, Convention jurisprudence for the domestic courts to go on. They might therefore point to the usefulness of an advisory opinion procedure within the ECHR system – on which see para 19(d) of the Brighton Declaration.
Although the above cases could be presented as Strasbourg substituting its view on the Convention for that of the national courts, the more accurate observation is this. The cases demonstrate that the Strasbourg Court is the authoritative body on the interpretation of Convention law, and violations of the Convention are likely to occur when it reaches a conclusion on the scope or extent of ECHR rights that differs from the domestic courts.
With this last point in mind it is interesting to see what else the draft Brighton declaration says about the principle of subsidiarity and “the interaction between the Court and national authorities”.
The draft Declaration proposes that, for reasons of “transparency and accessibility” (are these the real reasons?), “the principles of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation should be enhanced by their express inclusion in the Convention”, which should be amended accordingly (Para C 19(b)). The draft Declaration also calls for “a strong and open dialogue between the Court and national authorities as a means of developing an enhanced understanding of their respective roles” (Para C 19(c)).
But what are those respective roles? Para 16 of the draft Declaration states “The Court provides an authoritative interpretation of the Convention, and a safeguard for individuals whose rights and freedoms are not secured at the national level”. Should that not be “the” authoritative interpretation, or was the choice of the word “an” deliberate? As to the “safeguard” function, it is open to interpretation, but is this not suggestive of a more minimalist role for the Court than is currently the case?
After citing the “considerable [always?] margin of appreciation” that each State enjoys, para 17 then recounts that it falls to “democratically elected national parliaments” to decide how to implement the Convention and to domestic courts to apply the ECHR in reasoned judgments. Fine, although the draft Declaration states that, against that background, “the role of the Court is to [merely?] review decisions taken by national authorities to ensure that they are within the margin of appreciation”.
Are the messages being conveyed here not suggestive of a more general attempt to relegate the role and function of the Court to a sort of irrationality review in all contexts? Is this not an attempt to water down its substantive jurisdiction even in cases like those noted above? If this is not so, perhaps some extra paragraphs should be added to the draft Declaration confirming this.
Ed Bates, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Southampton, is the author of ‘The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights’, Oxford University Press, 2010.

Bron: http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2012/03/06/who-should-have-the-final-word-on-human-rights-dr-ed-bates/




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Britten willen invloed Europees Hof beperken

De regering van de Britse premier Cameron wil de invloed van het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens inperken. Foto Reuters / Stefan Wermuth

door Hans Klis

Buitenland

De Britse regering wil het Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens (EVRM) aanpassen en daarmee de invloed van het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens inperken.

Dat blijkt uit een ontwerpverklaring die uitgelekt is naar Britse media, meldt de BBC. De roep om een aanpassing van het EVRM komt op een moment dat het Verenigd Koninkrijk voorzitter is van de Raad van Europa, de organisatie waaronder het mensenrechtenhof valt. Londen wil tijdens een conferentie van de Raad in Brighton in april een akkoord bereiken over een beperktere rol van het mensenrechtenhof in Straatsburg, schrijft Mark Beunderman vandaag in NRC Handelsblad.

“Al enige tijd ligt het hof onder vuur in het Verenigd Koninkrijk. Het zou zich te activistisch opstellen en de soevereiniteit van nationale regeringen en parlementen aantasten. In het Verenigd Koninkrijk ontstond de afgelopen weken veel ophef omdat het mensenrechtenhof de uitlevering naar Jordanië verbood van Abu Qatada, een imam die ervan wordt verdacht de rechterhand van Osama bin Laden in Europa te zijn geweest.”

Volgens de Britse plannen moeten nationale regeringen een zogeheten grotere ‘margin of appreciation’ oftewel interpretatieruimte krijgen bij de toepassing van vonnissen uit Straatsburg. Daarnaast zou het mensenrechtenhof geen zaken behandelen die al gediend hebben bij nationale rechtbanken en de zaken op het laagste niveau overgelaten worden aan de nationale rechter.
De Britse roep om het EVRM aan te passen staat niet alleen in Europam, schrijft Beunderman. Ook in Nederland spreken politici hierover.

Ook de Nederlandse regering wil dat landen meer bevoegdheden krijgen om het mensenrechtenverdrag te interpreteren. In Den Haag gaan vooral uit VVD-hoek stemmen op tegen het ‘Straatsburgse activisme’ en voor nationale soevereiniteit.

Vorig jaar liet Thorbjørn Jagland, de secretaris-generaal van de Raad van Europa zich in NRC Handelsblad nog negatief uit tegen aanpassingen aan het EVRM. Hij waarschuwde dat deze het gezag van het Hof zou ondermijnen en landen als Rusland, die het niet nauw nemen met de mensenrechten, in de kaart zouden spelen.

Bron: http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2012/02/29/britten-willen-invloed-europees-hof-voor-de-rechten-van-de-mens-inperken/


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VACATURE: Rechter in het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens

Rechter in het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens

Organisatie: Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens (Frankrijk, Straatsburg)

Vacaturenummer: BD11/DW107-110203 
Sluitingsdatum: 23/10/2011

   

Functie-omschrijving

Wegens het terugtreden van de Nederlandse rechter in het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens, de heer mr. B.E.P. Myjer, ontstaat per 1 november 2012 een vacature. Met het oog daarop dient de Nederlandse regering aan de Raad van Europa een voordracht te doen van drie kandidaten voor genoemde functie.

De Parlementaire Vergadering van de Raad van Europa kiest op basis van die voordracht een Nederlandse rechter.

De Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken doet de voordracht aan de Ministerraad mede namens zijn ambtgenoot van Veiligheid en Justitie. Ten behoeve van de voordracht wordt een aanbeveling aan de Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken en Veiligheid en Justitie uitgebracht door een Aanbevelingscommissie.

Functie-eisen

Kandidaten dienen te voldoen aan de volgende eisen:

• het hoogst mogelijk zedelijk aanzien genieten en in zich verenigen de voorwaarden die worden vereist voor het uitoefenen van een hoge functie bij de rechterlijke macht, ofwel rechtsgeleerde zijn van erkende bekwaamheid;
• grondige kennis bezitten van het EVRM en de daarop gebaseerde jurisprudentie van het Hof;
• in beginsel beschikken over rechterlijke ervaring;
• de vaardigheid bezitten om zich mondeling en schriftelijk effectief in het Engels en/of Frans uit te drukken;
• beschikken over relevante internationale ervaring en rekening kunnen houden met verschillen in rechtsculturen van de landen van de Raad van Europa;
• gelet op het feit dat de benoemingstermijn van de rechters eindigt wanneer zij de leeftijd van 70 jaar bereiken, op een leeftijd zijn die benoeming voor negen jaar in beginsel mogelijk maakt.

De regering verwijst ten aanzien van het bovenstaande tevens naar de artikelen 21 tot en met 23 van het EVRM.

Een veiligheidsonderzoek op niveau B maakt onderdeel uit van de aanstellingsprocedure.
Voor informatie over het (niveau van het) veiligheidsonderzoek ziehttps://www.aivd.nl/onderwerpen-0/aivd/taken/#Veiligheidsonderzoekenuitvoerenb-taak.

Werk-/denkniveau

Master/doctoraal
- Universitair oude stijl
- Universitair Master

Arbeidsvoorwaarden

Salarisomschrijving:

Conform resoluties van Comité van Ministers van de Raad van Europa.

Dienstverband:	Tijdelijke aanstelling voor de duur van project / traject / werkzaamheden
Contractduur:	De ambtstermijn bedraagt negen jaar. Herbenoeming is niet mogelijk.
Maximaal aantal uren per week:	40

Overige arbeidsvoorwaarden:

Conform resoluties van Comité van Ministers van de Raad van Europa. 

Organisatie

Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens

Het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens is ingesteld om de nakoming te verzekeren van de verplichtingen die de Verdragspartijen op zich hebben genomen bij sluiting van het Verdrag tot bescherming van de rechten van de Mens en de fundamentele vrijheden. De rechtsmacht van het EHRM “strekt zich uit tot alle kwesties met betrekking tot de interpretatie en de toepassing van het Verdrag en de Protocollen daarbij die aan het Hof worden voorgelegd”.

Standplaats

Frankrijk, Straatsburg

Meer informatie

Meer informatie over de vacature:

Naam:	De heer mr. R.A.A. Böcker (Secretaris Aanbevelingscommissie, Ministerie Buitenlandse Zaken)
Telefoonnummer:	070 3484898
E-mailadres:	roeland.bocker@minbuza.nl
Naam (2):	De heer prof. mr. M. Kuijer (Secretaris Aanbevelingscommissie, Ministerie Veiligheid en Justitie)
Telefoonnummer (2):	070 3704861
E-mailadres (2):	m.kuijer@minvenj.nl

Meer informatie over de sollicitatieprocedure:

Naam:	De heer mr. R.A.A. Böcker (Secretaris Aanbevelingscommissie, Ministerie Buitenlandse Zaken)
Telefoonnummer:	070 3484898
E-mailadres:	roeland.bocker@minbuza.nl
Naam (2):	De heer prof. mr. M. Kuijer (Secretaris Aanbevelingscommissie, Ministerie Veiligheid en Justitie)
Telefoonnummer (2):	070 3704861
E-mailadres (2):	m.kuijer@minvenj.nl

Bijzonderheden

De kandidaat moet bereid zijn te verhuizen.

Degenen die de aandacht willen vestigen op naar hun mening geschikte kandidaten, wordt verzocht dit uiterlijk twee weken na publicatie van deze advertentie te doen bij de Minister van Veiligheid en Justitie op bovengenoemd adres.

Solliciteren naar deze functie

Schriftelijk solliciteren

Je reactie op de vacature Rechter in het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens ontvangen wij graag. Op dit moment kan dat alleen schriftelijk.

Stuur je curriculum vitae met begeleidende brief en dit ingevulde vragenformulier onder vermelding van vacaturenummer BD11/DW107-110203 naar:

De Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken en Veiligheid en Justitie
Intern adres: Directie Wetgeving, kamer H 511
Postbus 20301
2500 EH Den Haag

Bron: http://www.werkenbijdeoverheid.nl/vacatures/detail/rechter-in-het-europees-hof-voor-de-rechten-van-de-mens/index.cfm?vacature_id=GECXE3JM&adm_pin=01486&vp=0



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