Huiselijk geweld en Turkije: Withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention by Turkey: A Testing Problem for the Council of Europe
On Saturday 20 March 2021, Turkey woke up to a historic first – the announcement of its first withdrawal from a human rights treaty by the President. A presidential decision declared that Turkey was leaving the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence. This is the convention better known, most ironically, as the Istanbul Convention due to Turkey’s leading role in its creation.
Published in the Official Gazette in the early hours of 20 March 2021, Presidential Decision 3718 reads:
‘It is decided that the Council of Europe Treaty on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence signed on 11/5/2011 and ratified on 10/2/2012 with the Council of Ministers Decision No 2012/2816 is to be terminated based on Presidential Decree No 9 paragraph 3.’
The Istanbul Convention was ratified by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 24 November 2011. Its ratification was unanimous. On 10 February 2012, it was approved by the Council of Ministers, an organ now replaced with the President, as this constituted step two of the completion of the domestic ratification process. On 8 March 2012 (yes, indeed, International Women’s Day) Law No. 6284 was passed with the aim of incorporating the Istanbul Convention into domestic law. Its Article 1(a) states that it is ‘based on the Turkish Constitution and international treaties to which Turkey is a state party, in particular, the Council of Europe Treaty on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence.’
Throughout the weekend, constitutional lawyers and bar associations in Turkey repeatedly pointed out that this withdrawal decision is clearly against Turkey’s Constitution. This is due to the fundamental constitutional principle that the executive cannot usurp the powers of the legislature. Article 90 of the Constitution requires the Parliament to ratify human rights treaties by legislation. It is only following Parliament’s ratification that the President’s executive powers of approval and publication of international treaties are triggered under Article 104 of the Constitution, a provision that regulates the executive powers of the President. Human rights treaties, therefore, first become domestic law by way of a vote in Parliament passing a ratification law. Any law that is passed by Parliament cannot be the subject of executive amendment under the Constitution. The executive, that is the President, cannot exercise legislative functions. As a matter of domestic law, it cannot repeal a law, in this case, the Parliament’s act of ratification of the Istanbul Convention on 24 November 2011. This law can only be amended or repealed by the Parliament by passing a domestic law to denounce a treaty. It then becomes constitutionally possible for the President to complete the process of denunciation by giving effect to that law as the executive organ.
The President’s decision to withdraw from a human rights treaty in this case is based on his own prior presidential circular that assigns him the power to withdraw from a treaty. Yet, under Article 104 of the Constitution, this power can only be interpreted as an executive power. It cannot be used to override the acts of the legislative, making a human rights treaty part of domestic law by way of enacting a legislation. This decision, and the circular it rests on, therefore, points to a deeper decay in the basic structure of the Constitution in Turkey in delineating the sphere of action of the legislative and the executive under the Constitution. Those who argue for the domestic legality of the withdrawal decision based on a previous presidential circular, therefore, are defending that Presidential circulars can repeal existing domestic legislation. From the perspective of the well-established canon of constitutional law interpretation in Turkey, this is an untenable position, or rather an unconstitutional position. Accepting that human rights treaties made part of domestic law by the Parliament can be repealed by a presidential decision based on a Presidential decree means accepting that the President of Turkey can repeal existing domestic legislation. This also means defending that the President can withdraw from any human rights treaty, despite the presence of acts of Parliament making a treaty part of domestic law in the middle of any other night through simply publishing a presidential decision.
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